What if Garrett Hardin was wrong? What if the “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) was an oversimplified analogy
unreflective of the true system complexity?
If Dietz et al (2003) is to be believed, Hardin’s
oversimplification was twofold. First,
Hardin makes the assumption that centralized government and private property
were the only two institutions which could sustain commons over the long run. Two, he presumed that resource users were
trapped in a commons dilemma unable to take collective action.
But this does not reflect general reality. Traditional societies have sustainably
managed their common-pool resources for centuries through the development and maintenance of self-governing institutions. In a word,
they self-organize.
This self-organization, despite a lack of central command-and-control or the western notion of private property, has contributed to
social learning, adaptation and a capacity to deal with uncertainty. More succinctly put, Hardin’s metaphorical
herders, rather than spiraling toward tragedy, were actually engaged in a
sophisticated form of resource management now known as adaptive
governance.
LR>>We might add this case (Maine lobster fishery) to the growing list of cases used class. In part, it highlights the complexity of self-regulation. Dietz/Ostrom/Stern refer to the Maine fishery in their article.
ReplyDeleteCo-evolution and common-property are aspects of policy and practice we'll discuss over the next several classes.
Saunders, Pammela Quinn. “A Sea Change Off the Coast of Maine: Common Pool Resources as Cultural Property.”